This research investigated the perceptions of Commercial Motor Vehicle Operators and Safety Professionals regarding 35 commonly implemented practices used to improve operating safety. Several differences were found in how drivers of different backgrounds rated various practices, and between the drivers and safety managers. These differences were found to be persistent even when combined with measures of safety performance and experience. Managers tended to overvalue (relative to drivers) practices related to hiring, while drivers tended to overvalue (relative to managers) practices related to company support and reward systems. Motor Carriers, insurers, and regulators could consider areas of agreement with respect to high value practices as actionable for increased investment of resources. At the same time, resources allocated toward areas of low perceived value could be reduced.
INTRODUCTION
Motor Carriers spend a significant amount of resources on activities and programs designed to improve the safety of their operations. Large truck accidents have a tremendous impact on society (US Department of Transportation, 2006) . Motor vehicle accidents directly affect and disrupt the lives of the victims as well as their families and friends, especially when injuries or fatalities occur.
Accidents have declined quite significantly since the 1980's, however accidents continue to claim lives and to have serious consequences for individuals and society, along with negative economic consequences for the economy. One estimate of the average cost of an accident involving a truck with one trailer is $97,574 with the cost of a fatal accident estimated to be $3,833,721 (Pacific Institute for Research and Evaluation, 2006) . Indirect costs such as the disruption of the supply chain and delays in shippers' cargo further increase the costs associated with an accident. These costs affect the motor carriers involved. Higher insurance rates, lawsuits, environmental cleanup costs, and loss of corporate and consumer trust result when trucking firms fail to operate safely (Cantor, Corsi, and Grimm, 2006) . Carriers that incur these costs will find it difficult to succeed in a highly competitive environment. Consequently, motor carriers must enact practices that have a direct and positive impact on the safety performance of their firm Corsi, Fanara, and Jarrell, 1988; Mejza and Corsi, 1999; Monaco and Williams, 2000; Crum and Morrow, 2002; Baxter, 2003; Mejza et al., 2003; Melton and Van Dyne, 2004) .
With respect to assessments of the effectiveness of safety practices, most of those efforts have concentrated on the firm or the firm's safety manager (Brock et. al., 2007; Knipling, Hickman and Bergoffen 2003; Mejza and Corsi, 1999; Mejza et. al., 2003; Short et. al., 2007) . This is not surprising, as the safety program manager would be presumed to be the subject matter expert on the practices used. Many of these studies have found a high degree of agreement between safety managers and other safety professionals on two dimensions: first, what programs they are using; and second, their confidence in those programs (Knipling, Hickman and Bergoffen 2003, 2004. While previous studies have focused on the perceptions of safety program managers as the unit of analysis, it could also be posited that the driver of the commercial motor vehicle may be equally-if not more-capable of assessing the value of safety practices. The purpose of this research was to explore the perceptions of value related to safety practices in common use by North American motor carriers from the perspective of the drivers, and to compare these perceptions to those of the safety program managers. Three related hypotheses follow from the overall research question:
H1: Perceptions of value of safety practices differ between drivers and safety professionals. H2: Perceptions of value of safety practices differ between types of drivers: a. based on driving experience. b. based on type of driving performed.
H3: Perceptions of value of safety practices differ among drivers and managers, based on safety competence.
METHODOLOGY
The first phase of the study (building the instrument) sought to identify some of the most common safety practices in current use. A parallel effort consisting of both a review of the literature and open-ended surveys was conducted.
The literature review included the cataloguing of the results of other national level surveys (mentioned above). An initial list of common practices was developed Baxter, 2003; Mejza et. al., 2003; Knipling, Hickman and Bergoffen 2003, 2004) . This list of practices was then reviewed by a panel of subject matter experts (small groups of safety professionals and "million miler" professional drivers; 3-5 in each cohort; about 20 total).
The open ended survey of practices in use was sent to members of the state transportation association listed as "safety managers" or with a "safety" related job title. This survey asked respondents to list and describe the practices they were currently using at their firms by both "importance" and "value."
The results of the open ended survey (49 responses out of 287 total) were then combined with the results of the literature review to come up with a combined list. A second round of development took place in an attempt to validate and refine the list. Two groups (drivers and managers) were surveyed for their opinions on the "Importance" and "Value" of the programs. The first group consisted of professional drivers (independent owner-operators) under contract with a large general freight carrier. The second group included a subset of the safety professionals who were members of the state motor transportation association. While small numbers of safety professionals (fewer than 30) limited the results of this phase, the programs list was modified once again to capture the most common practices. Also, the results allowed the practices to be classified in logical categories that seemed to be consistent across the different types of motor carriers represented. As a result of this pilot testing, the research identified a total of 35 specific practices; and the practices fell Driver safety training, post-accident/violation into seven categories (see Table 1 ). The seven overall practice categories included:
• Training (TR)
• Monitoring and Analysis (MA)
Categories and items within categories were randomly sorted for the final instrument, to prevent bias as a result of "block responding" leading to an overestimate of internal validity in the analysis phase. The items were presented in a "Likert Scale" format, with respondent choices ranging from 1 "Lower Value" to 7 "Very High" value. Blank lines were included for respondents to add any practice they felt was missing from the list. See Table 1 for a list of all practices, with their variable identifiers by category.
The next phase of the study (data collection) included three different types of drivers in addition to the safety professionals. The driver types surveyed included: NOTR: New Over the Road drivers, at the conclusion of a 10-wk training program EOTR: Experienced Over the Road drivers, rotating through the major operations center LOCL: Generally experienced short-haul (waste disposal) local drivers The investigators chose to administer the survey instrument to the drivers in a face to face setting, based on previous experience. It is believed that the ability to explain the research, answer questions, and build trust with the respondents improves the reliability of the data collected. Random sampling was therefore not possible. A small cohort of participating firms were identified to serve as the basis for a sampling proxy. Firms were chosen to represent each of the three categories NOTR, EOTR, and LOCL. Drivers were then asked to participate in the survey as they rotated through the operations centers for training or administrative reasons.
Based on the high career mobility of the drivers, and the pseudo-random nature of their arrivals at the operations center, it is proposed that the drivers captured could represent a proxy for random sampling. Under this protocol, the participation rate of the drivers exceeded 95%.
Safety program managers (MGRS) were surveyed from among members of the state motor transportation association mailing list as described in the pilot testing phase. The list was examined for members identified as having safety related job titles or duties. An effort was made to validate the list by making email or telephone contact with each individual. The frame resulted in 309 total safety managers identified for survey administration. An iterative process of respondent contact was used, consisting of an initial postcard notification, a letter of support from the state motor transportation association asking for participation in the research project, the survey itself, a reminder postcard, and follow up email or phone reminders (Dillman, 2007) . A total of 68 surveys were returned, for a 22% response rate.
During the follow-up contact, the nonrespondents were asked to identify a reason for not responding. Anecdotally, the two most popular answers given (exact counts were not recorded) were either "Too Busy" or a response indicating they felt participating in the research would expose their firms to litigation risk. In depth discussion of this concern with nonrespondents found this belief to be very strong, and the perception to be widely held among safety professionals. In general, it was believed that participation in safety research involving the use and value of safety practices would be "discoverable" during litigation and could reflect poorly upon the firm. The researchers found this perception to be interesting in and of itself; perhaps meriting further investigation under a more rigorous process. Early vs. late responses were compared, and no significant differences were found beyond a potential bias for larger companies to respond earlier than smaller companies. It could be suggested therefore that a non-respondent bias may favor the larger (generally better performing; , among others) firms. However, the final respondent list showed only 9 out of the 68 firms could be considered "large" (over 100 power units) with the remainder being much smaller.
Two surveys were unusable due to incomplete information provided. The final usable sample of drivers included 531 NOTR, 102 EOTR, and 93 LOCL. The final sample of safety professionals (MGRS) included 66 responses, for a total data set of 792 respondents.
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
In an attempt to simplify the analysis, Exploratory Factor Analysis (with and without rotation) was performed on the 35 variables (SPSS v. 15.0) . While the practices were organized rationally according to categories, as validated by the pilot testing, the response data provided by the drivers did not support the use of categories as an empirical proxy for individual practices. Cross-loadings were significant; the variance between individual practices was larger than the variance shared among practices within a category. We can infer from the analysis that the perceived importance of individual practices is at least statistically more significant than the perceived importance of logical categories of practice.
For the purpose of illustration, factors were created representing the categories using the mean values of the variables within the category. Reliability assessment was performed on the pseudo-factors (categories) and the results are presented in Table 2 . Using the benchmark of Cronbach's Alphas of 0.7 or greater as an acceptable level of reliability (Nunnally, 1978; Hinkin, 1998 These results suggest that while caution must be used in presuming that the categorical pseudofactors represent the underlying practices, they capture enough of the variance between the practices to serve as proxies for the specific individual practices. However, due to the crossloadings detected during EFA and the correlations between categories, differences in value perceived by the respondents will be very difficult to detect. An argument could be made that any analysis would be biased against the detection of contrasts. Any statistically significant contrasts that do appear in spite of these difficulties would need to be interpreted in context.
Comparisons Between Categories of Practice
As previous research has generally focused on the assessments of the safety managers, the research looked at the opinions of drivers vs. the opinions of managers (see Tables 3-5) . Multiple pairwise comparisons were performed, with a significance threshold of 0.05 (two-tailed). Categories of practices were listed from "Most Valuable" to "Least Valuable," and designators (A, B, etc.) assigned based on whether they could or could not be separated at this level of confidence.
First, the perceptions of the managers were compared to the perceptions of drivers based on the 3 categories of drivers (NOTR, EOTR, LOCL; see Table 3 ). It was interesting that the It was also noted that the order of value for LOCL drivers vs MGRS was very similar; differing only in the preferred ordering of the bottom three categories (R, AW, TC for drivers vs. AW, TC, R for managers). The LOCL drivers rated the top practice categories lower in general, and were unable to distinguish between the top four. Overall, there was substantive agreement in relative value between the local drivers and the safety program managers. This differs from the "Over the Road" (long distance) drivers. The over the road drivers tended to rate Company Support slightly higher than the local drivers and managers. Another interesting split is found between the emphasis placed on "Hiring" practices. Due to the independent nature of long-distance drivers, perhaps they see less value in the screening function; local drivers and more experienced over the road drivers may appreciate the impact that hiring practices have. The effect of experience level in perceived usefulness of the seven categories of safety practices required further investigation.
Next, the drivers were grouped according to their level of experience for comparison to the safety managers (see Table 4 ). For this analysis, drivers were coded as "Experienced" if they had either more than one year or over 100,000 miles of professional driving experience (218 drivers) and "Inexperienced" if they had less time or miles behind the wheel (466 drivers). While this classification criteria is somewhat arbitrary, it is in line with the judgment of the senior safety managers with the firms involved in the study based on informal discussions. This contrast provides more noticeable differences. For example, as experience increases for drivers, the value placed on Hiring increases (while value of Rewards decreases); compared with the absolute highest (Hiring) and Lowest (Rewards) value ranks. The value placed on Company Support decreases with experience, falling from highest value for inexperienced drivers to second rank for experienced, and 4 th for managers.
The third set of pairwise comparisons was conducted between managers and drivers based on the safety record of the drivers (see Table 5 ). Drivers reporting "None" for involvement in Safety Events (moving violation, preventable or non preventable accident, near miss, etc.; a total of 507 drivers) were compared against those drivers experiencing at least one safety event in the last year (219 drivers). When grouped by safety event, the relative value assessments are almost identical to the assessments when grouped by experience. It could be expected that there would be significant overlap between "experience" and involvement in a safety event within the last year. Therefore, a second analysis was performed, sorting by involvement in safety event, after filtering out the responses of inexperienced drivers (see Table  6 ).
TABLE 3 MEAN PRACTICE CATEGORIES BY SOURCE
The relative assessments of value of categories of safety practices for experienced, safer (134 respondents) and experienced, less safe (86) drivers can now be compared against those of the managers. When the inexperienced drivers are filtered from the analysis, no additional contrast between "more safe" (no safety events) and "less safe" (some safety events) can be detected. The relative category values differ only within the ability of the pairwise comparison test to detect differences. The original differences noted between drivers and managers are not contradicted by this comparison.
Summary of Comparisons Between Categories of Practice
Pair-wise comparisons of means of the assessed values of the categories of practice were performed within various groups of respondents. The assessments of drivers were categorized 
Comparisons Between Individual Practices
Similar comparisons were made for assessments of value for individual practices. Many differences were detected; some contrasts are reported here. Three sets of contrasts will be reported here: the most highly valued quartile of practices, the least valued quartile of practices, and the practices with the greatest degree of disagreement between groups.
Mean value assessments were calculated for all practices by source of respondent. The eight Table 8 . Some similarities and differences exist in the ratings of the least valued practices between respondent categories here as well. TC2 (Electronic logs) are rated at or near the bottom for all respondent classes. R3 (Driving competitions) is also listed in the bottom eight for all respondents. MA3 (Log audits & analysis) and TC4 (Vehicle speed governors) are listed in the bottom eight for all drivers, but not managers. CS3 (Fatigue management programs) and TC1 (Global Positioning System GPS data i.e., Qualcomm) are listed in the managers bottom eight, but do not appear in any of the driver respondent categories bottom eight practices. It should also be noted that there is more agreement between the "Local" driver respondent category and the managers than between the managers and any other driver category.
The next phase of assessment involved looking for the practices that displayed the greatest amount of disagreement between all categories of drivers against the safety program managers (see Tables 9 and 10 ). For this analysis, practices were ranked by mean value. Differences in ranks between drivers and managers were calculated. The greatest 10 differences were calculated for both cases where drivers ranked the practice higher, and where managers ranked the practices higher.
The ranks and mean values for those practices where managers valued the practice much higher than drivers are shown in The ranks and mean values for those practices where drivers valued the practice much higher than managers are shown in Table 10 . Rank differences as well as the results of the one-way ANOVA test for significant differences between the means are also shown. The results shown appear less "mixed" across the practice categories; more consistent within categories than the disagreements where managers rated the practices more highly than drivers. The greatest disagreement was over R1 Cash incentives for driver safety performance. Also, Rewards R4 Individual driver safety awards (i.e., monthly, yearly) and R5 Million Mile Program exhibit great disagreement between drivers and managers. This could be ascribed to the drivers preferring cash incentives personally, aside from their honestly reported perception of value.
The drivers also rated Company Support practices (CS2, CS3, CS4, CS5, CS6) much higher than managers. Oddly, they did not disagree on CS1 Operations/safety alignment (safety mgr is a supervisor), which recognizes the implicit conflict between "safe operations" Individual disagreements also were discovered. Drivers rated TC1 Global Positioning System GPS data (i.e., Qualcomm), MA4 Post-accident/ incident review boards, and TR5 Driver safety training, post-accident/violation practices much higher than the safety managers. Overall, an argument could be made that drivers tended to rate those safety practices that involved them personally, or were "closest" to their actual job duties, were rated as more valuable. Unsurprisingly, they did not seem to value practices that they would not personally or directly participate in.
Summary of Comparisons Between Individual Practices
As with the practice categories, significant disagreements were noted between classes of respondent for perceived value of individual safety program practices. When considering the most valued practices by driver sub-group, all 
Safety Performance Weighted Perceptions of Value
Additional investigation was performed exploring the role of safety performance (competence) in altering the relative perception of safety practice value (see Tables 5 and 6 ). For these comparisons, safety competence was constructed as a "weighting factor" to be multiplied by the value scale for each respondent and category/practice variable.
The drivers were asked to self-assess their own safety competence relative to "The average commercial driver on the road" using 5 questions on a 7-point Likert scale addressing:
• Safety record • Adherence to company safety policies and recommendations • Setting the example for other drivers to follow in terms of safety practices • Adherence to all Federal, State and Local safety regulations • Track record of compliance for inspections and enforcement Drivers were also asked to self-report any involvement in "safety events" during the previous year. Safety Events included "near miss" situations not resulting in accidents, preventable accidents, non-preventable accidents, moving violations, inspections resulting in "out of service" determinations, and a write-in "Other" category. If the driver chose "none" a value of 0 was assigned. If no events were checked (including "none") then the response was counted as a missing value and the weight was not calculated. The aggregate safety competence score or weight was calculated as the average of the 5 Likert scale questions (value 1-7) minus the number of Safety Events (value 0-6). Actual values for the weights ranged from a low of 0 to a high of 7, with a mean of 5.29.
The safety performance/competence weight for the safety managers was calculated on the firm level. Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration safety statistics (the "SAFESTAT" database; FMCSA 2009) were used. It must be noted that the "SAFER/ SafeStat" system has been replaced by the CSA 2010 system. At the time this research was conducted, stability and reliability problems in the newer CSA 2010 system prevented the use of the newer metrics. Statistics used to evaluate firm safety performance on a relative (to other firms) percentile basis include the Driver and Vehicle Safety Evaluation Area Scores (SEAS). SEAS statistics take on values between zero (the highest rated firm; better than 100% of all other firms) and 100 (the worst performing firm; better than 0% of all other firms). This research created a composite SEAS safety performance value using the following formula:
(1) Firm SFac = [(200 -DSEAS + VSEAS)/ 200]*7 (from FMCSA SafeStat database) The composite weighting factor added the driver and vehicle SEAS and inverted the scale by subtracting from the maximum possible value of 200. A relative value between 0-1 was created by dividing by the maximum score, and this relative value was centered to take on final values between 0-7 in an effort to make it at least comparable to the driver calculated safety performance weights. The final firm level weighting factor took on values between 1.20 and 6.94, with a mean of 3.85. Firms for which SEAS data were incomplete were not assigned a safety performance score. The final safety performance weighted subsample included 380 NOTR, 101 EOTR, 91 LOCL, and 52 MGRS respondents.
Comparisons were now run using the safety performance weight multiplied by the perceived value for each category of practice (Tables 11  and 12 ) and individual practice (Tables 13 and  14) . Table 11 represents the same analysis as Table 3 , except that the categories of practice used were the "safety weighted" categories. For the NOTR and EOTR classes of driver, the order of perceived values are identical to those found in Table 3 . For LOCL drivers, the order of mean values are slightly different, but the order changes do not exceed the statistically significant grouping indicators. For the MGRS, the order is identical to the unweighted order, with minor differences in grouping indicator boundaries. Overall, the safety performance weighted safety practice category perceived values differ, and differ between the driver and manager groups. The way these perceived values differ is quite similar to the way the nonsafety performance weighted values differ.
The analysis was continued for the practice categories by experience level. Table 12 is analogous to Table 4, except that in Table 12 we use the safety performance weighted categories. The MGRS group is unchanged from Table 11, but the driver groups are now divided into two groups based on miles/year driven. For the more experienced drivers, the order of perceived value is identical to that found on Table 4 (unweighted). The order changes slightly for the less experienced drivers, but the order changes again do not exceed the statistically significant grouping indicators. As in the previous analysis, the way these perceived values differ is quite similar to the way the non-safety performance weighted values differ.
Next, the top eight (Table 13; analogous to Table  7 ) and bottom eight (Table 14; analogous to  Table 8 ) individual practices were examined. In Table 13 , we see that significant differences in perceived value exist for all classes of drivers and managers. However, these differences are quite similar to those shown on Table 7 for the unweighted values. For driver cohort NOTR, the top eight practices are identical, differing only in the individual order of CS6-R1 and TR5-CS4. Results are similar for group EOTR. For groups LOCL and MGRS, the unweighted vs. weighted perceived values are again similar; however, two other differences exist. For LOCL drivers, the practice R1 leaves the list of top eight and AW3 enters. For the MGRS, MA2 leaves the list and AW3 enters. This would suggest that as safety performance increases, the perceived value of AW3 "Post-accident/incident information to drivers" increases in perceived value.
Similar results were found for the perceived value of individual practices at the lower end of the value order (Table 14) . For the NOTR and EOTR classes of drivers, the bottom eight practices are the same, with only minor differences in order for the NOTR group. The same is true for the LOCL drivers and managers, with two individual exceptions. For the LOCL drivers, the practice H5 fell into the bottom eight practices, and R3 rose in value out of the bottom eight. For the MGRS, AW1 dropped into the lower eight, and AW5 rose out of the bottom. We conclude that differences in relative rankings of safety-weighted safety practices exist and are significant; and differ only slightly from those differences shown for the unweighted practices.
Safety Performance vs. Perceived Value
A final investigation of the relationship between safety performance and perceived value of safety practices was conducted. For this analysis, bivariate correlations were conducted between the individual respondent "safety performance score" and their rating of perceived value for safety practices and categories of practice. The effort was to assess if levels of safety performance covaried with the value placed on practices. Sample size becomes an issue here, as the final safety performance weighted subsample included 380 NOTR, 101 EOTR, 91 LOCL, and only 52 MGRS respondents.
The first analysis (Table 15) captured the relationship between safety performance and the value of categories of safety practices. Due to the small number of datapoints, none of the correlations were statistically significant for the MGRS. For the driver groups, all correlations between safety performance and categories of practice were statistically significant for NOTR, and most were significant for EOTR and LOCL. Sample size may have been an issue with the two smaller driver groups as well. A positive relationship indicates that as safety performance increases, the relative perceived value increases as well. While this might not be practically significant in an absolute sense (safer drivers tend to rate all safety programs as being more valuable in general), the relative magnitude of association may suggest a means of comparison between programs (higher R 2 means a closer tie between performance and perceived value). A higher correlation would suggest increased perceived value by respondents with higher safety performance scores. For this data, correlation coefficients ranged between 0.2-0.3. When compared to the mean perceived values and safety weighted mean perceived values, the correlation strength metric suggests a different order. For example, the NOTR drivers rank "Awareness" as being fairly low with respect to the other categories, while it is the highest rated using a correlation measure.
The second analysis captured the relationship between safety performance and the value of individual practices (Table 16 ). The reduced sample size creates greater problems here. None of the MGRS relationships were statistically significant. Fewer than half of the EOTR and LOCL relationships were statistically significant, and three of the practices were not statistically significant for the NOTR group. Three findings are worth noting. First, the order based on strength of association does differ substantively from the order based on perceived value. This is similar to the finding for categories of practice. Second, most of the practices are positively related to safety performance, again suggesting that drivers with higher safety performance tend to rate safety practices higher than drivers with low safety performance scores. Third, there is a statistically significant exception to this: for LOCL drivers, practice R1 "Cash Incentives for Driver Safety Performance" is negatively related to safety performance. This suggests that the worse performing drivers value cash incentives higher than safer drivers, and safer drivers value cash incentives lower than worse performing drivers. This was the only statistically significant negative relationship between safety performance and safety practice found in this data set. While this is an interesting result, it may be an artifact of the problems with sample size in this category. 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
The purpose of the research was to explore the perceived value of a set of popular practices used by commercial motor carriers to improve the safety performance of their operations. Three hypotheses were investigated, and can now be addressed directly.
(H1) Perceptions of value of safety practices differ between drivers and safety professionals.
This hypothesis is strongly supported by the data. The hypothesis was supported across all types of contrasts investigated. The difference between drivers and safety managers is lowest between managers and local drivers, and greatest between managers and over the road drivers. Tables 9 and 10 summarize the "degree of disagreement" between drivers and managers. This was supported for both categories of practices and individual practices.
(H2a) Perceptions of value of safety practices differ between types of drivers based on driving expertise
This hypothesis is only weakly supported by the data. While the data show clear preference differences based on experience, the relative preference between less and more experienced drivers were similar. Differences were discovered between "new" and "experienced" over the road drivers, but experience was not a discriminator by itself.
(H2b) Perceptions of value of safety practices differ between types of drivers based on type of driving performed.
This hypothesis was strongly supported by the data. Contrasts were revealed between newer and more experienced over the road drivers, and between both classes of over the road drivers and local drivers. The differences were apparent for both categories of safety practices and individual practices.
(H3) Perceptions of value of safety practices differ among drivers and managers, based on safety competence.
This hypothesis was investigated using three different approaches. The first approach (Tables  5 and 6 ) used a binary discriminator for drivers, based on involvement in "safety events." Significant differences were found between categories of practice; however, these differences were not sensitive to involvement in safety events. The second approach created continuous variables representing safety performance or competence, and looked for (Tables 11-14) . Contrasts were found between safety weighted practices for all driver and manager cohorts. These differences were only slightly divergent from the unweighted perceived value scores, lending only weak support to the hypothesis. The third type of contrast was to correlate the perceived value of safety practices against the safety performance score (Tables 15 and 16 ). Data were insufficient to directly address the hypothesis. The evidence showed that safety performance was correlated to the perceived value of safety programs in general (safer drivers place higher value on safety practices). In addition, the strength of the correlation (as a ranking metric) provided different results from using the perceived value directly. We conclude that the hypothesis is weakly supported, and merits additional investigation.
MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS
Different classes of drivers and safety program managers share perceptions of the value of some safety practices and categories of practice. In general, practices falling within the Training category were highly rated by all categories of drivers and safety program managers. In particular, the practice TR1 Driver Safety Training, Prevention during Initial Hiring or Analysis, Company-Wide Support, Rewards, and Technology. Almost 800 surveys were analyzed from subgroups including both new and experienced over the road and local drivers, and safety program managers. Comparisons were made between subgroups on the individual practices and categories of practice. While much agreement was found on the importance and usefulness of practices in general, notable differences were found in how drivers of different backgrounds rated various practices, and between the drivers and safety managers.
The logical next step must certainly include an attempt to explain and resolve the differences. For practices and categories of practice where drivers and managers disagree, the potential exists for program managers to achieve better safety program results by realigning their resource allocations in accordance with the drivers' assessments. Of course, the drivers' assessments could be inaccurate; in which case, such a reallocation would decrease safety program performance. Given this reason these findings must be approached with caution. The effectiveness of these practices and categories of practice must be measured in some objective way. Obviously, the effectiveness of motor carrier safety practices has already been investigated (for some related summaries see , Knipling, Hickman and Bergoffen 2003 , Mejza et. al. 2003 , Brock et. al. 2007 , among others). However, none of the previous studies have explicitly surveyed the drivers themselves for their opinions on the effectiveness of safety practices. Using the firm as the unit of analysis for these assessments of practice effectiveness limits the inference that can be drawn, due to confounds that are inherent in studies of these types. It is suggested that only by reviewing the effect of these practices on the individual driver can an appropriate assessment be made. For example, in order to assess the effectiveness of a certain type of training, one should investigate before-after attitudes and behaviors of individuals undergoing the training treatment-in lieu of comparing the performance of firms using that type of training vs. firms that don't. This approach is obviously not possible for all practices evaluated here. The effects of mandatory drug testing are moot-the testing is required regardless of effectiveness. "Hiring Practices" are also not tractable to an analysis based on an experimental design evaluation of treatments at the individual level. However, an evaluation of hiring practices could be conducted as a pseudo experiment, where safety event involvement is correlated with the various pre-hiring practices in use. For example, a screening process that would deselect a driver above a certain threshold of past failed vehicle inspections could be correlated with future behavior based on driving records. No single approach to evaluating the various practices should be used; however, this research suggests that using the individual driver as the unit of analysis may yield stronger inference and value to practitioners than the more traditional approaches. 
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